advantage over the Persians, we are induced to suspect
that all this blaze of imaginary glory was designed to conceal some real
disgrace.

Our suspicious are confirmed by the authority of a contemporary
historian, who mentions the virtues of Alexander with respect, and
his faults with candor. He describes the judicious plan which had been
formed for the conduct of the war. Three Roman armies were destined
to invade Persia at the same time, and by different roads. But the
operations of the campaign, though wisely concerted, were not executed
either with ability or success. The first of these armies, as soon as it
had entered the marshy plains of Babylon, towards the artificial
conflux of the Euphrates and the Tigris, was encompassed by the superior
numbers, and destroyed by the arrows of the enemy. The alliance of
Chosroes, king of Armenia, and the long tract of mountainous country,
in which the Persian cavalry was of little service, opened a secure
entrance into the heart of Media, to the second of the Roman armies.
These brave troops laid waste the adjacent provinces, and by several
successful actions against Artaxerxes, gave a faint color to the
emperor's vanity. But the retreat of this victorious army was imprudent,
or at least unfortunate. In repassing the mountains, great numbers of
soldiers perished by the badness of the roads, and the severity of
the winter season. It had been resolved, that whilst these two great
detachments penetrated into the opposite extremes of the Persian
dominions, the main body, under the command of Alexander himself, should
support their attack, by invading the centre of the kingdom. But the
unexperienced youth, influenced by his mother's counsels, and perhaps by
his own fears, deserted the bravest troops, and the fairest prospect of
victory; and after consuming in Mesopotamia an inactive and inglorious
summer, he led back to Antioch an army diminished by sickness, and
provoked by disappointment. The behavior of Artaxerxes had been very
different. Flying with rapidity from the hills of Media to the marshes
of the Euphrates, he had everywhere opposed the invaders in person; and
in either fortune had united with the ablest conduct the most undaunted
resolution. But in several obstinate engagements against the veteran
legions of Rome, the Persian monarch had lost the flower of his troops.
Even his victories had weakened his power. The favorable opportunities
of the absence of Alexander, an