n
with the body?"

"It appears so."

"And it appears, Simmias, to the generality of men, that he who takes no
pleasure in such things, and who does not use them, does not deserve to
live; but that he nearly approaches to death who cares nothing for the
pleasures that subsist through the body."

"You speak very truly."

"But what with respect to the acquisition of wisdom, is the body an
impediment or not, if anyone takes it with him as a partner in the
search? What I mean is this: Do sight and hearing convey any truth to
men, or are they such as the poets constantly sing, who say that we
neither hear nor see anything with accuracy? If, however, these bodily
senses are neither accurate nor clear, much less can the others be so:
for they are all far inferior to these. Do they not seem so to you?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"When, then," said he, "does the soul light on the truth? for, when it
attempts to consider anything in conjunction with the body, it is plain
that it is then led astray by it."

"You say truly."

"Must it not then be by reasoning, if at all, that any of the things
that really are become known to it?"

"Yes."

"And surely the soul then reasons best when none of these things
disturbs it, neither hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor pleasure of any
kind, but it retires as much as possible within itself, taking leave of
the body, and, as far as it can, not communicating or being in contact
with it, it aims at the discovery of that which is."

"Such is the case."

"Does not then the soul of the philosopher, in these cases, despise the
body, and flee from it, and seek to retire within itself?"

"It appears so."

"But what as to such things as these, Simmias? Do we say that justice
itself is something or nothing?"

"We say it is something, by Jupiter."

"And that beauty and goodness are something?"

"How not?"

"Now, then, have you ever seen anything of this kind with your eyes?"

"By no means," he replied.

"Did you ever lay hold of them by any other bodily sense? but I speak
generally, as of magnitude, health, strength, and, in a word, of the
essence of everything, that is to say, what each is. Is then the exact
truth of these perceived by means of the body, or is it thus, whoever
among us habituates himself to reflect most deeply and accurately on
each several thing about which he is considering, he will make the
nearest approach to the knowledge of it?"

"Certainly."

"Would no