f
Free Will on the other. The Libertarians assert that our wills are
free--we having power of choice in all our actions. The Determinists, on
the other hand, contend that our thoughts and actions are determined by
definite, ascertainable causes. They contend that the _feeling_ of
freedom we all experience is but illusory, and that, in reality, our
every action is inevitable--predetermined by its previous cause of
causes, and could have been predicted by an intelligence wide enough and
possessing a grasp deep enough of human nature to perceive life in all
its tendencies. Indeed, one eminent philosopher went so far as to say
that a belief in Free Will showed simple ignorance of science and a
clinging to superstition!

A great deal has been written upon this subject of Free Will in the
past; the point has been bitterly disputed for years. It may be said,
however, that, at the present day, practically all philosophers and
scientists, with few exceptions (e.g., James, Schiller, Bergson, etc.),
believe in Determinism. The arguments for that doctrine are certainly
weighty, and may be summarized, briefly, as follows:

1. _The Law of Conservation of Energy_ tells us that no energy can be
added to or abstracted from the total stock of physical energy in the
universe. If the will be a non-physical energy (as it is conceived to
be, by psychologists), it cannot affect the physical world, for if it
did the law of Conservation of Energy would be overthrown. Hence, the
will cannot affect the material world: hence, it cannot be a true cause.

2. _Biology_ contends that heredity and environment alone are capable of
explaining the actions and movements of the lower organisms, without
postulating any "will." Inasmuch as man is connected with these lower
organisms by an unbroken line of descent, why should not these factors
explain man's actions also?

3. _Physiology_ teaches that in-coming nerve stimuli give rise to
certain physical changes in the nerve cells or centres, which, in turn,
give rise to out-going (afferent) currents. There is here an arc or loop
of unbroken physical causation; and there is no "room" for
consciousness, save as an "epiphenomenon," as postulated by Huxley.

4. The _Law of Causation_ tells us that an effect must have a cause, and
that the cause must, in a certain sense, resemble the effect--since the
effect _is_, in a sense, the cause translated. But, inasmuch as the
effect is a physical event, the cause must