erefore no power to interfere with the right.
But he suggested that the exercise of that right, or, to use his actual
phrase, the "actions in accord with that right," rested on the basis of
civil, positive law, and could therefore be controlled by legal
decisions. The right was sacred, its exercise was purely conventional.
Thus every man has a right to property; he can never by any possible
means divest himself of it, for it is rooted in the depths of his being,
and supported by his human nature. But this right appears especially to
be something internal, intrinsic. For him to exercise it--that is to
say, to hold this land or that, or indeed any land at all--the State's
intervention must be secured. At least the State can control his action
in buying, selling, or otherwise obtaining it. His right cannot be
denied, but for reasons of social importance its exercise well may be.
Nor did this then appear as a merely unmeaning distinction; he would not
admit that a right which could not be exercised was hardly worth
consideration. And, in point of fact, the Pope's private theory found
very many supporters.

There were others, however, who judged it altogether too fantastical.
The most interesting of his opponents was a certain Antonio Roselli, a
very judiciously-minded civil lawyer, who goes very thoroughly into the
point at issue. He gives Innocent's views, and quotes what authority he
can find for them in the Digest and Decretals. But for himself he would
prefer to admit that the right to private property is not at all sacred
or natural in the sense of being inviolable. He willingly concedes to
the State the right to judge all claims of possession. This is the more
startling since ordinarily his views are extremely moderate, and
throughout the controversy between Pope and Emperor he succeeded in
steering a very careful, delicate course. To him, however, all rights to
property were purely civil and arguable only on principles of positive
law. There was no need, therefore, to discriminate between the right and
its exercise, for both equally could be controlled by the State. There
are evidences to show that he admitted the right of each man to the
support of his own life, and, therefore, to private property in the form
of actual food, &c., necessary for the immediate moment; but he
distinctly asserts as his own personal idea that "the prince could take
away my right to a thing, and any exercise of that right," adding only
tha