g now kept France and Europe on terms
but the feeble cabinet of Louis XVI. The impatience of the nation, the
ambition of the Girondists, and the resentment of the constitutionalists
wounded through M. de Narbonne, united them to overthrow this cabinet.
Brissot, Vergniaud, Guadet, Condorcet, Gensonne, Petion, their friends
in the Assembly, the council-chamber of Madame Roland, their Seids
amongst the Jacobins balanced between two ambitions--equally open to
their abilities--to destroy power or seize on it. Brissot counselled
this latter measure. More conversant with politics than the young
orators of the Gironde, he did not comprehend the Revolution without
government; anarchy, in his opinion, did not destroy the monarchy more
than it did liberty. The greater were events, the more necessary was the
direction of them. Placed disarmed in the foremost rank of the Assembly
and of opinion, power presented itself, and it was necessary to lay
hands upon it. Once in their grasp, they would make of it, according to
the dictates of fortune and the will of the people, a monarchy or a
republic. Ready for any thing that would allow them to reign in the name
of the king or of the people, this counsel was pleasing to men who had
scarcely emerged from obscurity, and who, seduced by the facility of
their good fortune, seized on it at its first smile. Men who ascend
quickly, easily become giddy.

Still a very profound line of policy was disclosed in the secret council
of the Girondists, in the choice of the men whom they put forward, and
whom they presented for ministers to the king.

Brissot in this gave evidence of the patience of consummate ambition. He
inspired Vergniaud, Petion, Guadet, Gensonne, as well as all the leading
men of his party, with similar patience. He remained with them in the
twilight close to power, but not included in the projected ministry,
being desirous of feeling the pulse of popular opinion through secondary
men, who could be disavowed or sacrificed at need, and keeping in
reserve himself and the leaders of the Girondists, either to support or
overthrow this weak and transitory ministry, if the nation should
resolve upon more decisive measures. Brissot, and those who acted with
him, were thus ready at all points, as well to direct as to replace
power--they were masters without any responsibility. The doctrines of
Machiavel were very perceptible in this tactic of statesmen. Besides, by
abstaining from entering i