ability of the
king. But, if it be true that in our territory there is a vast
population spread,--if it be true that there are amongst them a
multitude of men exclusively given up to those intellectual speculations
which excite ambition and the love of fame,--if it be true that around
us powerful neighbours compel us to form but one compact body in order
to resist them,--if it be true that all these circumstances are
irresistible, and are wholly independent of ourselves, it is undeniable
that the sole existing remedy lies in a monarchical government. When a
country is populous and extensive, there are--and political experience
proves it--but two modes of assuring to it a solid and permanent
existence. Either you must organise those parts separately;--you must
place in each section of the empire a portion of the government, and
thus you will maintain security at the expense of unity, strength, and
all the advantages which result from a great and homogeneous
association:--or else you will be forced to centralise an unchangeable
power, which, never renewed by the law, presenting incessantly obstacles
to ambition, resists with advantage the shocks, rivalries, and rapid
vibrations of an immense population, agitated by all the passions
engendered by long established society. These facts decide our position.
We can only be strong through a federative government, which no one here
has the madness to propose, or by a monarchical government, such as you
have established; that is to say, by confiding the reins of the
executive power to a family having the right of hereditary succession.
You have intrusted to an inviolable king the exclusive function of
naming the agents of his power, but you have made those agents
responsible. To be independent the king must be inviolable: do not let
us set aside this axiom. We have never failed to observe this as regards
individuals, let us regard it as respects the monarch. Our principles,
the constitution, the law, declare that he has not forfeited (_qu'il
n'est pas dechu_): thus, then, we have to choose between our attachment
to the constitution and our resentment against an individual. Yes, I
demand at this moment from him amongst you all, who may have conceived
against the head of the executive power prejudices however strong, and
resentment however deep; I ask at his hands whether he is more irritated
against the king than he is attached to the laws of his country? I would
say to those who r