of political affairs may be discerned. But for me, if I can
in any way accomplish it, while I adopt the same general principles as
Plato, I am seeking to reduce them to experience and practice, not in
the shadow and picture of a state, but in a real and actual
Commonwealth, of unrivalled amplitude and power; in order to be able to
point out, with the most graphic precision, the causes of every
political good and social evil.

For after Rome had flourished more than two hundred and forty years
under her kings and interreges, and after Tarquin was sent into
banishment, the Roman people conceived as much detestation of the name
of king as they had once experienced regret at the death, or rather
disappearance, of Romulus. Therefore, as in the first instance they
could hardly bear the idea of losing a king, so in the latter, after
the expulsion of Tarquin, they could not endure to hear the name of a
king.[326] * * *

XXXI. * * * Therefore, when that admirable constitution of Romulus had
lasted steadily about two hundred and forty years. * * * The whole of
that law was abolished. In this humor, our ancestors banished
Collatinus, in spite of his innocence, because of the suspicion that
attached to his family, and all the rest of the Tarquins, on account of
the unpopularity of their name. In the same humor, Valerius Publicola
was the first to lower the fasces before the people, when he spoke in
the assembly of the people. He also had the materials of his house
conveyed to the foot of Mount Velia, having observed that the
commencement of his edifice on the summit of this hill, where King
Tullius had once dwelt, excited the suspicions of the people.

It was the same man, who in this respect pre-eminently deserved the
name of Publicola, who carried in favor of the people the first law
received in the Comitia Centuriata, that no magistrate should sentence
to death or scourging a Roman citizen who appealed from his authority
to the people. And the pontifical books attest that the right of appeal
had existed, even against the decision of the kings. Our augural books
affirm the same thing. And the Twelve Tables prove, by a multitude of
laws, that there was a right of appeal from every judgment and penalty.
Besides, the historical fact that the decemviri who compiled the laws
were created with the privilege of judging without appeal, sufficiently
proves that the other magistrates had not the same power. And a
consular law, passed by