to be borne by the President alone. Benton and
other prominent members, however, painted Jackson as the savior of his
country; and the second vote of 22 to 19 yielded a narrower majority
for the bill than the first had done. Thus the measure perished.

The bank men received the veto with equanimity. They professed to
believe that the balderdash in which the message abounded would make
converts for their side; they even printed thirty thousand copies of
the document for circulation. Events, however, did not sustain their
optimism. In the ensuing campaign the Bank became, by its own choice,
the leading issue. The National Republicans, whose nominee was Clay,
defended the institution and attacked the veto; the Jacksonians
reiterated on the stump every charge and argument that their leader
had taught them. The verdict was decisive. Jackson received 219 and
Clay 49 electoral votes.

The President was unquestionably right in interpreting his triumph as
an endorsement of the veto, and he naturally felt that the question
was settled. The officers and friends of the Bank still hoped,
however, to snatch victory from defeat. They had no expectation of
converting Jackson or of carrying a charter measure at an early date.
But they foresaw that to wind up the business of the Bank in 1836 it
would be necessary to call in loans and to withdraw a vast amount of
currency from circulation, with the result of a general disturbance,
if not a severe crippling, of business. This, they thought, would
bring about an eleventh-hour measure giving the Bank a new lease of
life.

Jackson, too, realized that a sudden termination of the activities of
the Bank would derange business and produce distress, and that under
these circumstances a charter might be wrung from Congress in spite of
a veto. But he had no intention of allowing matters to come to such a
pass.

His plan was rather to cut off by degrees the activities of the Bank,
until at last they could be suspended altogether without a shock. The
most obvious means of doing this was to withdraw the heavy deposits
made by the Government; and to this course the President fully
committed himself as soon as the results of the election were known.
He was impelled, further, by the conviction--notwithstanding
unimpeachable evidence to the contrary--that the Bank was insolvent,
and by his indignation at the refusal of Biddle and his associates to
accept the electoral verdict as final. "Biddle shan't