wers. The Constitution and the oath provided in it
devolve upon the President the power and duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed. The Constitution, in order to carry out this power,
gives him the choice of the agents, and makes them subject to his
control and supervision. But in the execution of these laws the
constitutional obligation upon the President remains, but the power
to exercise that constitutional duty is effectually taken away. The
military commander is as to the power of appointment made to take the
place of the President, and the General of the Army the place of the
Senate; and any attempt on the part of the President to assert his own
constitutional power may, under pretense of law, be met by official
insubordination. It is to be feared that these military officers,
looking to the authority given by these laws rather than to the letter
of the Constitution, will recognize no authority but the commander of
the district and the General of the Army.

If there were no other objection than this to this proposed legislation,
it would be sufficient. Whilst I hold the chief executive authority of
the United States, whilst the obligation rests upon me to see that all
the laws are faithfully executed, I can never willingly surrender that
trust or the powers given for its execution. I can never give my assent
to be made responsible for the faithful execution of laws, and at the
same time surrender that trust and the powers which accompany it to any
other executive officer, high or low, or to any number of executive
officers. If this executive trust, vested by the Constitution in the
President, is to be taken from him and vested in a subordinate officer,
the responsibility will be with Congress in clothing the subordinate
with unconstitutional power and with the officer who assumes its
exercise.

This interference with the constitutional authority of the executive
department is an evil that will inevitably sap the foundations of our
federal system; but it is not the worst evil of this legislation. It is
a great public wrong to take from the President powers conferred on him
alone by the Constitution, but the wrong is more flagrant and more
dangerous when the powers so taken from the President are conferred upon
subordinate executive officers, and especially upon military officers.
Over nearly one-third of the States of the Union military power,
regulated by no fixed law, rules supreme. Each one of the fi