ly been agitated, the success of the Constitution of the
United States, as a new and peculiar system of free representative
government, was held doubtful in other countries, and was even a subject
of patriotic apprehension among the American people themselves. A trial
of nearly eighty years, through the vicissitudes of foreign conflicts
and of civil war, is confidently regarded as having extinguished all
such doubts and apprehensions for the future. During that eighty years
the people of the United States have enjoyed a measure of security,
peace, prosperity, and happiness never surpassed by any nation. It can
not be doubted that the triumphant success of the Constitution is due
to the wonderful wisdom with which the functions of government were
distributed between the three principal departments--the legislative,
the executive, and the judicial--and to the fidelity with which each
has confined itself or been confined by the general voice of the nation
within its peculiar and proper sphere. While a just, proper, and
watchful jealousy of executive power constantly prevails, as it ought
ever to prevail, yet it is equally true that an efficient Executive,
capable, in the language of the oath prescribed to the President, of
executing the laws and, within the sphere of executive action, of
preserving, protecting, and defending the Constitution of the United
States, is an indispensable security for tranquillity at home and peace,
honor, and safety abroad. Governments have been erected in many
countries upon our model. If one or many of them have thus far failed in
fully securing to their people the benefits which we have derived from
our system, it may be confidently asserted that their misfortune has
resulted from their unfortunate failure to maintain the integrity of
each of the three great departments while preserving harmony among
them all.

Having at an early period accepted the Constitution in regard to the
Executive office in the sense in which it was interpreted with the
concurrence of its founders, I have found no sufficient grounds in the
arguments now opposed to that construction or in any assumed necessity
of the times for changing those opinions. For these reasons I return
the bill to the Senate, in which House it originated, for the further
consideration of Congress which the Constitution prescribes. Insomuch as
the several parts of the bill which I have not considered are matters
chiefly of detail and are based