feebly; on the night of the 7th a line-of-battle
ship was set on fire by a mortar, and burned nearly all night; it
contained a large supply of spirits, the blue flames from which cast a
lugubrious light on the ramparts from the harbor to the Malakoff,
producing, says Todleben, "a painful impression on the souls of the
defenders of Sebastopol."

Daylight on the 8th found the Russian defences completely manned, the
guns loaded with grape, and the reserves brought close up. But the
assault was not yet begun, and the result of these preparations to
receive it was increased havoc in the exposed ranks of the defenders.

The attack on the Redan was to be directed by General Codrington. His
division, and the Second, under General Markham, were to supply the
column of attack, of which the covering party, the ladder party, the
working party (to fill up the ditch and convert what works we might gain
to our own purpose), and the main body were to number seventeen hundred,
and the supports fifteen hundred. The remainder of these two divisions,
numbering three thousand, was to be in reserve in the third parallel.
Also, in the last reserve, were the Third and Fourth Divisions.

No attack on the Redan would have been undertaken by the English as an
isolated operation. Our compulsory distance from that work, the want of
a place of arms (that is to say, a covered space in the advanced
trenches of sufficient extent to harbor large bodies of troops), the
construction of which was forbidden by the rocky soil, and the still
unsubdued fire from the ramparts, all condemned an assault. But it was
deemed necessary as a distraction in aid of the French, and it fulfilled
the purpose.

The portion of Codrington's troops destined to head the attack on the
Redan moved rapidly and steadily across the open space, though suffering
much loss from the heavy fire of round-shot, grape, case, and musketry
now directed on them from every available point, and those in front
passed with ease over the battered rampart and entered the work. But the
rest, with too strong a reminiscence of their mode of action in the
trenches, lay down at the edge of the ditch and began firing, alongside
of the covering troops, who alone should have performed this duty. The
supports also reached the ditch, and some of them entered the work. But
the great reserves, in moving through the inches toward the point of
issue, were obstructed and discouraged by meeting the numbers of w