conclusion of peace.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the influence exerted by this compact
on the Russo-Japanese war. It kept the field clear for Japan and
guaranteed her against a repetition of such a combination as that
which must be regarded as the remote cause of the struggle.

THE EARLY PHASES OF THE WAR

Japan's great problem in crossing swords with Russia was to obtain a
safe avenue for her troops over the sea. Russia might at once have
gained an overwhelming advantage had she seized and controlled the
lines of communication between the Japanese islands and the continent
of Asia. Her strategists can scarcely have failed to appreciate that
fact, and would doubtless have acted accordingly had they obtained a
few months' leisure to mass an overwhelmingly strong fleet in the
seas of China and Japan. They had such a fleet actually in esse; for,
at the moment when war broke out, the Russian squadrons assembled in
the East, or en route thither, comprised no less than fifty-nine
fighting ships, mounting 1350 guns and manned by 18,000 men. But
these figures included the Mediterranean squadron which, surprised by
the outbreak of hostilities, abandoned its journey to the Pacific.
Obviously, Japan's wisest course was to anticipate the combination of
Russia's sea forces, and consciousness of that fact operated to
hasten the current of events.

Port Arthur, where the bulk of the Russian Pacific squadron lay, is
somewhat difficult of ingress and egress. On January 31, 1904, the
operation of extracting the ships and parading them outside was
commenced, being brought to a conclusion on February 3rd, whereafter
the squadron steamed out to sea, and, having made a short cruise off
the coast of the Shantung promontory, returned to its position on the
following day. The fleet taking part in this manoeuvre consisted of
twenty-six ships, and the whole Russian naval force then in eastern
Asia comprised seven battle-ships, four armoured cruisers, seven
protected cruisers, four gunboats, six sloops, twenty-five
destroyers, two mining transports, and fourteen first-class
torpedo-boats.

The Japanese, on their side, had six battle-ships, eight armoured
cruisers, thirteen protected cruisers, fourteen small cruisers,
nineteen destroyers, and eighty-five torpedo-boats. This enumeration
shows a numerical superiority on the Japanese side, but in fighting
capacity the two fleets were nearly equal. For, though the Russians
possessed seven b