ordable in many places during the spring." On the right bank
of the Yalu, at the point of its junction with the Ai, the ground
rises so as to command the position taken by the Russians.

The plan of the Japanese commander was to threaten an attack on the
lower radius of the river; to throw two divisions against
Kiuliencheng, and to use the remaining division in a wide flanking
movement, crossing the river higher up. The battle took place on
Sunday, the 1st of May. During the preceding nights, the Japanese
placed a strong force of artillery in cleverly masked batteries, and
under cover of these guns, threw seven bridges across the river, the
highest upstream being thirteen miles above Kiuliencheng and the
lower two being directed to the centre of the Russian position.
General Kuroki then telegraphed to Tokyo that he proposed to attack
at dawn on Sunday, his plan being to march one division across the
fords of the Ai River, and to employ the other two, one in crumpling
up the Russian left, the other in attacking Antung, where a large
Russian force was in position. This programme was accurately carried
out. The Japanese infantry forded the Ai breast-deep, and, swarming
up the heights, drove the Russians from these strong positions.
Meanwhile, the Japanese guards' division had crossed on the left and
directed its march upon Antung, while the remaining division had
completely turned the Russian left flank. The fiercest struggle
occurred at Homutang, where a Russian regiment and a battery of
artillery made a splendid stand to save their comrades at Antung from
being cut off.

The casualties on the Japanese side were 318 killed, including five
officers, and 783 wounded, including thirty-three officers. The
Russian casualties numbered 1363 killed and 613 prisoners, but the
detail of wounded was not published. The Japanese captured twenty-one
quick-firing field-guns, eight machine-guns, 1021 rifles and a
quantity of ammunition, etc. The moral result of this battle can
hardly be overestimated. It had never been seriously believed in
Europe that a Russian army could be conquered by a Japanese in a fair
fight, and probably that incredulity influenced Kuropatkin when he
ordered Sassulitch to defy strategical principles by attempting to
hold a radically defective position against a greatly superior force.
In a moment, the Japanese were crowned with military laurels and
placed on a pedestal for the world to admire. But the Japanese