or three miles before
again running east.

This north and south stretch, as before said, divided the Boer
military line of the Tugela. Since the battle of Colenso all their
positions had been strengthened, especially {p.294} the eastern
portion south of the river, previously comparatively neglected; and
continuous entrenchments now extended from Hlangwane east for three
miles to a treeless height named Green Hill. East of this, again, and
connected with it, is a range called Monte Cristo, which runs
north-west to the Tugela. This district south of the river, and
between it and the entrenchments just mentioned, is for the most part
rugged and intricate, but less so than the region west of Colenso and
north of the stream.

The occupation of Hussar Hill on February 12 was for reconnaissance
only. The force was afterwards withdrawn. On the 14th the real
movement began. Hussar Hill was again taken, and from that day the
operations, though varying in activity, were continuous until the
18th, when, after two days of heavy fighting from hill to hill, the
British succeeded in gaining possession of Green Hill, their ultimate
object, upon the enemy's left flank. The Boers then evacuated
Hlangwane, which was occupied on the 19th by the British. The
positions of the Boers south of the Tugela and east of the bend had
{p.295} thus all fallen, weakening their left flank, at the same
moment that Roberts, arriving at Paardeberg, found Cronje hemmed in
the bed of the Modder.

Buller's turning movement had now driven the Boers into the
mountainous country between Colenso and Ladysmith, west of the bend in
the Tugela. Here, when his campaign opened in December, had been the
strength of their position. Its general character has been already
mentioned, as well as some particular features--Grobler's Kloof, two
miles above Colenso, the kopjes behind Fort Wylie commanding the
bridge, etc. Between Grobler's and the northerly stretch of the river
ran the railroad to Ladysmith, threading a maze of hills which a stay
of three months had made intimately familiar to the Boers, both men
and officers. The accidents of the ground, and their mutual influence
from the military point of view, had been carefully studied and
artificially improved, by men whose natural aptitudes for defensive
warfare and choice of positions is of the highest. In nothing do they
seem to have shown more skill than in the preparation of traps,
{p.296} whereby success, won w