conomical, we are inclined to conceit, that he would long since have
arrived at the _finiquito de todas cuentas_.

We now come to his naval cost of colonies, with a margin for ordnance as
well. On this head, Mr Cobden remarks, with much sagacity--and, for once,
Mr Cobden states one fact in which we may agree with him:--"But the
colonies had no ships to form a navy. The mother country had to send them
ships to guard their territories, which were not paid for by the colonies,
but out of the taxation of this country. The navy estimates for this year
amounted to L.6,322,000. He had no means of ascertaining what proportion
of this large amount was required for their colonies; but a very large
proportion of it was taken for the navy in their colonies. The ordnance
estimate was L.1,849,142, a large share of which was required for their
colonial expenditure. The House would find, that from the lowest estimate,
from L.5,000,000 to L.6,000,000 out of the taxes of this country were
required for maintaining their colonial army and navy." True it is, the
colonies have no ships of war; true, the navy expenses count for the
gigantic sum stated--in the estimates at least, and estimates seldom fall
short, however budgets may; true, also, that ordnance is the heavy item
represented. And we also are without the means for any, not to say
accurate, but fair approximative estimate of the proportion of this
expenditure which may be incurred for, and duly chargeable against the
colonies. In the case of the army, as we have shown, the possession and
facilities of reference to documents, enabled us to resolve Mr Cobden's
bill of totals, in one line, into the elements of which composed, to
classify the items under distinct heads, and so to detect the errors, and
redress the balance of his own account. The authorities, of official origin
mostly, to which we had recourse, were equally open to Cobden, had he been
actuated by an anxious desire to arrive at the truth, earnest in his
enquiries after the means of information, laborious in his investigations,
and, beyond all, with honesty of purpose resolved nothing to withhold, nor
aught to set down in malice, as the result of his researches.
Unfortunately, the navy is not a stationary body, as the army may be said
to be; squadrons are not fixtures like corps in garrison; here to-day and
gone to morrow. The naval strength on the various stations, never
permanent, escapes calculation, as the due apportionm