re of England's naval supremacy along the Syrian coast
should have dispelled any notion that he could rival the exploits of
Alexander and become Emperor of the East.[112]

From conjectures about motives we turn to facts. Setting forth early
in February, the French captured most of the Turkish advanced guard at
the fort of El Arisch, but sent their captives away on condition of
not bearing arms against France for at least one year. The victors
then marched on Jaffa, and, in spite of a spirited defence, took it
by storm (March 7th). Flushed with their triumph over a cruel and
detested foe, the soldiers were giving up the city to pillage and
massacre, when two aides-de-camp promised quarter to a large body of
the defenders, who had sought refuge in a large caravanserai; and
their lives were grudgingly spared by the victors. Bonaparte
vehemently reproached his aides-de-camp for their ill-timed clemency.
What could he now do with these 2,500 or 3,000 prisoners? They could
not be trusted to serve with the French; besides, the provisions
scarcely sufficed for Bonaparte's own men, who began to complain
loudly at sharing any with Turks and Albanians. They could not be sent
away to Egypt, there to spread discontent: and only 300 Egyptians were
so sent away.[113] Finally, on the demand of his generals and troops,
the remaining prisoners were shot down on the seashore. There is,
however, no warrant for the malicious assertion that Bonaparte readily
gave the fatal order. On the contrary, he delayed it for three days,
until the growing difficulties and the loud complaints of his soldiers
wrung it from him as a last resort.

Moreover, several of the victims had already fought against him at El
Arisch, and had violated their promise that they would fight no more
against the French in that campaign. M. Lanfrey's assertion that there
is no evidence for the identification is untenable, in view of a
document which I have discovered in the Records of the British
Admiralty. Inclosed with Sir Sidney Smith's despatches is one from the
secretary of Gezzar, dated Acre, March 1st, 1799, in which the Pacha
urgently entreats the British commodore to come to his help, because
his (Gezzar's) troops had failed to hold El Arisch, and the _same
troops_ had also abandoned Gaza and were in great dread of the French
at Jaffa. Considered from the military point of view, the massacre at
Jaffa is perhaps defensible; and Bonaparte's reluctant assent
contra