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reign Office, August 6th, 1813: " ... Your Lordship will collect from these instructions that a general peace, in order to provide adequately for the tranquillity and independence of Europe, ought, in the judgment of His Majesty's Government, to confine France at least within the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine: and if the other Great Powers of Europe should feel themselves enabled to contend for such a Peace, Great Britain is fully prepared to concur with them in such a line of policy. If, however, the Powers most immediately concerned should determine, rather than encounter the risks of a more protracted struggle, to trust for their own security to a more imperfect arrangement, it never has been the policy of the British Government to attempt to dictate to other States a perseverance in war, which they did not themselves recognize to be essential to their own as well as to the common safety." As regards details, we desired to see the restoration of Venetia to Austria, of the Papal States to the Pope, of the north-west of Italy to the King of Sardinia, but trusted that "a liberal establishment" might be found for Murat in the centre of Italy. Napoleon knew that we desired to limit France to the "natural frontiers" and that we were resolved to insist on our maritime claims. As our Government took this unpopular line, and went further than Austria in its plans for restricting French influence, he had an excellent opportunity for separating the Continental Powers from us. But he gave out that those Powers were bought by England, and that we were bent on humiliating France.] [Footnote 342: Boyen, "Erinnerungen," Pt. III., p. 66.] [Footnote 343: Fain, vol. ii., p. 27. The italicized words are given thus by him; but they read like a later excuse for Napoleon's failures.] [Footnote 344: "Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany," p. 195.] [Footnote 345: In his letters of August 16th to Macdonald and Ney he assumed that the allies might strike at Dresden, or even as far west as Zwickau: but meanwhile he would march "pour enlever Bluecher."] [Footnote 346: "Lettres inedites de Napoleon." The Emperor forwarded this suggestion to Savary (August 11th): it doubtless meant an issue of false paper notes, such as had been circulated in Russia the year before.] [Footnote 347: Cathcart, "Commentaries," p. 206.] [Footnote 348: "Extrait d'un Memoire sur la Campagne de 1813." With characteristic inaccuracy Marbot rem
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