nting-houses_, and ought not to disgrace
the seat of power by its squalid aspect. Whenever it touches
sovereign power, the nation is ruined. It is too
short-sighted to defend itself. It is a compromising spirit,
always ready to yield a part to save the residue. It is too
timid to have in itself the laws of self-preservation.
Sovereign power is never safe but under the shield of
honor."

This was thought very fine talk in those simple days among the simple
Southern country members.

As the session progressed, Mr. Calhoun spoke frequently, and with
greater effect. Wisely he never spoke. In his best efforts we see that
something which we know not what to name, unless we call it
_Southernism_. If it were allowable to use a slang expression, we
should style the passages to which we refer effective bosh. The most
telling passage in the most telling speech which he delivered at this
session may serve to illustrate our meaning. Imagine these short,
vigorous sentences uttered with great rapidity, in a loud, harsh
voice, and with energy the most intense:--

"Tie down a hero, and he feels the puncture of a pin; throw
him into battle, and he is almost insensible to vital
gashes. So in war. Impelled alternately by hope and fear,
stimulated by revenge, depressed by shame, or elevated by
victory, the people become invincible. No privation can
shake their fortitude; no calamity break their spirit. Even
when equally successful, the contrast between the two
systems is striking. War and restriction may leave the
country equally exhausted; but the latter not only leaves
you poor, but, even when successful, dispirited, divided,
discontented, with diminished patriotism, and the morals of
a considerable portion of your people corrupted. Not so in
war. In that state, the common danger unites all,
strengthens the bonds of society, and feeds the flame of
patriotism. The national character mounts to energy. In
exchange for the expenses and privations of war, you obtain
military and naval skill, and a more perfect organization of
such parts of your administration as are connected with the
science of national defence. Sir, are these advantages to be
counted as trifles in the present state of the world? Can
they be measured by moneyed valuation? I would prefer a
single victory over the enemy, by sea o