emory of the present generation. The House of Commons is
now supreme in the State, but is accountable to the nation. Even those
members who are not chosen by large constituent bodies are kept in awe
by public opinion. Every thing is printed; every thing is discussed;
every material word uttered in debate is read by a million of people on
the morrow. Within a few hours after an important division, the lists
of the majority and the minority are scanned and analysed in every town
from Plymouth to Inverness. If a name be found where it ought not to be,
the apostate is certain to be reminded in sharp language of the promises
which he has broken and of the professions which he has belied. At
present, therefore, the best way in which a government can secure the
support of a majority of the representative body is by gaining the
confidence of the nation.

But between the time when our Parliaments ceased to be controlled by
royal prerogative and the time when they began to be constantly and
effectually controlled by public opinion there was a long interval.
After the Restoration, no government ventured to return to those methods
by which, before the civil war, the freedom of deliberation has been
restrained. A member could no longer be called to account for his
harangues or his votes. He might obstruct the passing of bills of
supply; he might arraign the whole foreign policy of the country; he
might lay on the table articles of impeachment against all the chief
ministers; and he ran not the smallest risk of being treated as Morrice
had been treated by Elizabeth, or Eliot by Charles the First. The
senator now stood in no awe of the Court. Nevertheless all the defences
behind which the feeble Parliaments of the sixteenth century had
entrenched themselves against the attacks of prerogative were not only
still kept up, but were extended and strengthened. No politician seems
to have been aware that these defences were no longer needed for their
original purpose, and had begun to serve a purpose very different.
The rules which had been originally designed to secure faithful
representatives against the displeasure of the Sovereign, now operated
to secure unfaithful representatives against the displeasure of the
people, and proved much more effectual for the latter end than they had
ever been for the former. It was natural, it was inevitable, that, in
a legislative body emancipated from the restraints of the sixteenth
century, and not ye