proved
to be one of the causes of the civil war which followed. 'For the joy
Pompeius conceived on this occasion, added to the high opinion he had of
his achievements, intoxicated him so far that, bidding adieu to the
caution and prudence which had put his good fortune and the glory of his
actions upon a sure footing, he gave in to the most extravagant
presumption and even contempt of Caesar; insomuch that he declared, "He
had not need of arms nor any extraordinary preparations against him,
since he could pull him down with much more ease than he had set him
up".' When people like Cicero expressed their fear that Caesar might
march upon Rome with his army he said, 'In Italy, if I do but stamp upon
the ground an army will appear.' Filled with such notions, he proceeded
recklessly to drive Caesar to desperation. He refused to disband his own
troops (two legions which he had lent to Caesar, and Caesar, on his
demand, had returned to him loaded with presents); instead of backing
Caesar's candidature for the consulship for the year in which he was due
to return from Gaul he opposed him in every way. Finally, he made it
quite clear that if Caesar came to Rome without his army he would be in
serious danger; and at the same time insisted that he should do so.

What this must lead to was plain enough to people in Rome. When they
heard that Caesar had crossed the Rubicon (49) at the head of his troops
(regardless of Sulla's law) they fell into a panic. The Senate was
terrified of Caesar and not much less afraid of Pompeius. But disunited
as the Conservatives were among themselves, he was the only man who
could hold them together at all, and their only general. If Pompeius had
acted firmly at the crisis, whether with Caesar or against him, he might
have prevented the civil war. But at a time when every day was vital he
did nothing at all for several days, remained in his own house without
giving any lead or staying in any way the gathering tumult and
excitement. Refugees began to pour into Rome. For some reason or other
every one took it for granted that Caesar was going to march on the
city, though as a matter of fact he had made no move. At last Pompeius
declared that the country was in danger and that every one should leave
Rome. He himself left the city to muster the great bodies of soldiers in
Italy into an army. Very soon afterwards the consuls fled, in such a
hurry that they left the State treasures behind them, and with mos