cited at the
bar, from Hawkins himself, nor by any adjudged case. I think I may
boldly assert, then, that the merely having in possession a libel
printed and published in a foreign country only, is not an indictable
offence here, and publication of the same libel here.

Let us then examine how far these alleged libels, which, although not
subjects of criminal prosecution here, can be made use of to sustain the
publication, or prove, or aid in proving, the criminal intent or malice
in the publication of another libel charged in the first count, and of
the publication of which some evidence has been offered to the jury. Now
the libels in the first count, of which evidence of publication has been
given to the jury, is of itself libellous, or it is not; if it be
libellous and published, the law deduces the criminal intent from the
libellous matter itself, and therefore requires no aid from other
libellous writings to sustain it: if it be not libellous, it cannot be
made so by showing other libellous writings of the traverser, of which
he is not accused or charged in the indictment. I mean the libellous
matter itself in the libel is, in the eye of the law, proof of criminal
intent, if it be published, unless the traverser can rebut this
inference of law by proving his innocence of any criminal intent, by
some sufficient excuse, as that some person stole the copy from him and
published it without his knowledge or consent. But the Attorney for the
United States urged that these pamphlets, indicating the one charged in
the first count, contained or expressed opinions which coincided with
his sentiments on the subject matter of them; and this was urged as a
reason for admitting them in evidence. This, in my view, amounts to
nothing more than that he appropriated to himself and adopted the
thoughts of others. What proof could this appropriation or adoption
afford of a malicious intent in their publication? Every man has an
unquestionable right to his own moral or religious sentiments: there
is no crime in this: it would be criminal to restrain any man in this
country in his own, or in adopting the moral or religious opinions of
others, if he please; it is criminal only when he attempts to propagate
them, and only when they have a tendency to disturb the peace of
society--to invade the general rights of property--and are most
essentially criminal, if they have a tendency to produce the dreadful
results charged in the indictment.