execution of such intention as strong evidence of change of purpose
from fear of the consequences or for other reasons, as of malice in the
publication of one of them in the way, and under the circumstances, in
which the one charged to have been published in the first count was
published? It is very clear, it seems to me, that if there were no other
evidence of any other publication of any of the pamphlets in question,
than the inscription on the corner "read this and circulate," that the
indictment could not be sustained, because such inscriptions, if the
pamphlets are never shown to any other person, is in the eye of the law
harmless. If, then, we are asked to admit such inscriptions or pamphlets
never shown to, or seen by any other person within this District,
because there is evidence that one such pamphlet was permitted to be
seen and partly read by another, must we not look at the evidence which
proves such exhibition of such pamphlets, and connect that with such
inscriptions on other pamphlets not published, to see how far such
inscriptions go to fortify and strengthen the evidence of malice as to
the published pamphlets? In other words, to see what legal inferences
of additional evidence such inscriptions afford? If this were a case
of ordinary importance, I should say without much hesitation, that they
afford no such inferences. It is for the jury to draw inferences of
guilt or malice from circumstances; they are fully competent to do so in
the present case from the evidence now before them; but it is often and
almost always a nice point for a court to instruct a jury from what
circumstances or facts inferences of guilt or malice may be drawn. It is
saying, Gentlemen of the jury, such and such a circumstance, if proved
to your satisfaction, is evidence from which you may and ought to find
against the traverser. It satisfies our minds and ought to satisfy
yours. But juries ought and will judge for themselves in criminal cases;
and I have always thought it a delicate matter in criminal cases, to
give such instructions to juries. Here we are not asked to give an
instruction; but we are asked to permit evidence to go the jury, which,
if allowed, carries with it the opinion of the court that such evidence
affords inference of malice. I must see such inference pretty clear
myself, before I give my sanction to the jury to draw such inference
themselves. It is true the law denounces any published writing having a
tendenc