by the marriage contract, as
pecuniary arrangements are now often pre-appointed. There would
seldom be any difficulty in deciding such things by mutual consent,
unless the marriage was one of those unhappy ones in which all other
things, as well as this, become subjects of bickering and dispute.
The division of rights would naturally follow the division of duties
and functions; and that is already made by consent, or at all events
not by law, but by general custom, modified and modifiable at the
pleasure of the persons concerned.
The real practical decision of affairs, to whichever may be given the
legal authority, will greatly depend, as it even now does, upon
comparative qualifications. The mere fact that he is usually the
eldest, will in most cases give the preponderance to the man; at
least until they both attain a time of life at which the difference
in their years is of no importance. There will naturally also be a
more potential voice on the side, whichever it is, that brings the
means of support. Inequality from this source does not depend on the
law of marriage, but on the general conditions of human society, as
now constituted. The influence of mental superiority, either general
or special, and of superior decision of character, will necessarily
tell for much. It always does so at present. And this fact shows how
little foundation there is for the apprehension that the powers and
responsibilities of partners in life (as of partners in business),
cannot be satisfactorily apportioned by agreement between themselves.
They always are so apportioned, except in cases in which the marriage
institution is a failure. Things never come to an issue of downright
power on one side, and obedience on the other, except where the
connexion altogether has been a mistake, and it would be a blessing
to both parties to be relieved from it. Some may say that the very
thing by which an amicable settlement of differences becomes
possible, is the power of legal compulsion known to be in reserve; as
people submit to an arbitration because there is a court of law in
the background, which they know that they can be forced to obey. But
to make the cases parallel, we must suppose that the rule of the
court of law was, not to try the cause, but to give judgment always
for the same side, suppose the defendant. If so, the amenability to
it would be a motive with the plaintiff to agree to almost any
arbitration, but it would be just the rev
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