tatives in Senate and House, and may plausibly
claim that they can show a better title to admission than Nevada ever
did, or Utah or Idaho.

Nor does the great name of Marshall stand alone in support of such
conclusions. The converse theory that these territories are not
necessarily included in the constitutional term "the United States"
makes them our subject dependencies, and at once the figure of
Jefferson himself is evoked, with all the signers of the immortal
Declaration grouped about him, renewing the old war-cry that government
derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. At different
periods in our history eminent statesmen have made protests on grounds
of that sort. Even the first bill for Mr. Jefferson's own purchase of
Louisiana was denounced by Mr. Macon as "establishing a species of
government unknown to the United States"; by Mr. Lucas as "establishing
elementary principles never previously introduced in the government of
any Territory of the United States"; and by Mr. Campbell as "really
establishing a complete despotism." In 1823 Chancellor Kent said, with
reference to Columbia River settlements, that "a government by Congress
as absolute sovereign, over colonies, absolute dependents, was not
congenial to the free and independent spirit of American institutions."
In 1848 John C. Calhoun declared that "the conquest and retention of
Mexico as a province would be a departure from the settled policy of
the Government, in conflict with its character and genius, and in the
end subversive of our free institutions." In 1857 Mr. Chief Justice
Taney said that "a power to rule territory without restriction as a
colony or dependent province would be inconsistent with the nature of
our Government." And now, following warily in this line, the eminent
and trusted advocate of similar opinions to-day, Mr. Senator Hoar of
Massachusetts, says: "The making of new States and providing national
defense are constitutional ends, so that we may acquire and hold
territory for those purposes. The governing of subject peoples is not a
constitutional end, and there is therefore no constitutional warrant
for acquiring and holding territory for that purpose."

[Sidenote: An Alleged Constitutional Inability.]

We have now, as is believed, presented with entire fairness a summary
of the more important aspects in which the constitutional objections
mentioned have been urged. I would not underrate by a hair's breadth
the a