ies can only be obtained at the point of the
sword, and its convoys are everywhere threatened or captured.

The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and,
though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our
admiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of
humanity, we ought to hope never to see it. This uprising must not be
confounded with a national defense in accordance with the institutions
of the state and directed by the government.

This uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. The serfs may
rise in a body at the call of the government, and their masters,
affected by a noble love of their sovereign and country, may set them
the example and take the command of them; and, similarly, a fanatical
people may arm under the appeal of its priests; or a people enthusiastic
in its political opinions, or animated by a sacred love of its
institutions, may rush to meet the enemy in defense of all it holds most
dear.

The control of the sea is of much importance in the results of a
national invasion. If the people possess a long stretch of coast, and
are masters of the sea or in alliance with a power which controls it,
their power of resistance is quintupled, not only on account of the
facility of feeding the insurrection and of alarming the enemy on all
the points he may occupy, but still more by the difficulties which will
be thrown in the way of his procuring supplies by the sea.

The nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the facility
of a national defense. In mountainous countries the people are always
most formidable; next to these are countries covered with extensive
forests.

The resistance of the Swiss to Austria and to the Duke of Burgundy, that
of the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809, the difficulties encountered by the
Russians in the subjugation of the tribes of the Caucasus, and, finally,
the reiterated efforts of the Tyrolese, clearly demonstrate that the
inhabitants of mountainous regions have always resisted for a longer
time than those of the plains,--which is due as much to the difference
in character and customs as to the difference in the natural features of
the countries.

Defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this kind of
defense; and the Bocage of La Vendee, so justly celebrated, proves that
any country, even if it be only traversed by large hedges and ditches or
canals, admits of a formidable d