ze his communications, to outflank him, to cut
his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his
forces,--such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first
campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the very
best.

When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distances
and the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not so successful as
in Germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war is
not suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chances
of success are still very great, and it is based upon principle.
Napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its real
advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and they
are made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and of
the adjoining states.

The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations are
almost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive points, and
in what will be stated in Article XXI. in discussing the choice of lines
of operations.

As to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally depend
upon the aim of the war and the character which political or other
circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities of
the two parties.

In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may
be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,--such
as the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory.
In other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success
by incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the
hostile army, as did Napoleon.

The maneuvers of Ulm and Jena cannot be recommended to an army whose
only object is the siege of Antwerp. For very different reasons, they
could not be recommended to the French army beyond the Niemen, five
hundred leagues from its frontiers, because there would be much more to
be lost by failure than a general could reasonably hope to gain by
success.

There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are
determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they
play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and
plans of cabinets. They may be called _political objective points_.

Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war in
its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises are