ed to remain neutral in the struggle, since they did not
wish to bring down upon them the wrath of the Kansas people, who
were within easy striking distance. By prompt action these wavering
aborigines could be brought into the Confederate ranks and be made to
render important assistance.

He had already crossed the Missouri line with 3,000 mounted men, and on
the night of the 4th of July came to Buffalo Creek, 12 miles southwest
of Neosho, where he was joined by Gen. Price with 1,700 mounted men, and
he sent urgent messages back to the rest of his men to hurry forward
to him. These were so well obeyed that he shortly had, independent of
Price's men, fully 5,000 men from Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana, who
were better equipt and organized than the Missourians.

Gov. Jackson and Gen. Price also sent urgent messages for concentration,
which were as promptly responded to. The result was that there were
shortly assembled Confederates under Gen. McCulloch and "State Guards"
under Gov. Jackson and Gen. Price, a total estimated by Maj. Sturgis and
others at 23,-000 men. For lack of proper arms and organization, many
of these were not very effective. McCulloch says that the great horde of
mounted men "were much in the way," and hindered rather than helped
But they were certainly very effective in harrying the Union people; in
impressing recruits; in embarrassing Lyon's gathering of supplies; in
driving in the small parties he sent out, and confining his operations
to the neighborhood of Springfield.

146

In the meanwhile the great disaster of Bull Run had occurred to depress
the Union people and fill the Secessionists with unbounded enthusiasm
and confidence. The thoughts of the Government and of the loyal
people of the country became concentrated upon securing the safety of
Washington. Troops were being rushed from every part of the country to
the National Capital. Lyon's forces were constantly dwindling, from
the expiration of the three months for which the regiments had been
enlisted. The men felt the need of their presence at home, to attend
to their hastily-left affairs, and could see no prospect of a decisive
battle as a reason for remaining. Gen. Lyon importuned Gen. Fremont and
the War Department for some regiments, for adequate supplies for those
he had, and money with which to pay them. The War Department, however,
could apparently think of nothing else than making Washington safe,
while Gen. Fremont, deeming St