us conviction
of the truth. And we are not bound to technical definitions of
crimes and misdemeanors.

"A willful violation of the law, a gross and palpable breach of
moral obligations tending to unfit an officer for the proper
discharge of his office, or to bring the office into public contempt
and derision, is, when charged and proven, an impeachable offense.
And the nature and criminality of the offense may depend on the
official character of the accused. A judge would be held to higher
official purity, and an executive officer to a stricter observance
of the letter of the law. The President, bound as a citizen to
obey the law, and specially sworn to execute the law, may properly,
in his high office as chief magistrate, be held to a stricter
responsibility than if his example was less dangerous to the public
safety. Still, to justify the conviction of the President there
must be specific allegations of some crime or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude, gross misconduct, or a willful violation of law,
and the proof must be such as to satisfy the conscience of the
truth of the charge.

"The principal charges against the President are that he willfully
and purposely violated the constitution and the laws, in the order
for the removal of Mr. Stanton, and in the order for the appointment
of General Thomas as Secretary of War _ad interim_. These two
orders were contemporaneous--part of the same transaction--but are
distinct acts, and are made the basis of separate articles of
impeachment."

I stated the grounds of my conviction that the action of the
President, in placing Lorenzo Thomas in charge of the office of
Secretary of War, without the advice and consent of the Senate,
was a clearly illegal act, committed for the purpose of obtaining
control of that office. I held that the President had the power
to remove Secretary Stanton, but that he had not the power to put
anyone in his place unless the person appointed was confirmed by
the Senate.

Did the act of March 2, 1867, commonly known as the "tenure of
office act," confer this authority? On the contrary, it plainly
prohibits all temporary appointments except as specially provided
for. The third section repeats the constitutional authority of
the President to fill all vacancies happening during the recess of
the Senate by death or resignation, and provides that if no
appointment is made during the following session to fill such
vacancy, the office shal