he most comprehensive and instructive debate
on financial questions for many years.

The bill, as it then stood, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury
to issue registered or coupon bonds of the United States, in such
form and of such denominations as he might prescribe, payable,
principal and interest, in coin, and bearing interest at the rate
of five per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually, such bonds to
be payable forty years from date and to be redeemable in coin after
ten years.

It authorized the exchange of the bonds commonly known as the 5-20
bonds for the bonds authorized by that bill. It also authorized
the holders of United States notes to the amount of $1,000, or any
multiple of that sum, to convert them into the five per cent. bonds
provided for by the bill. This bill passed the Senate on the 14th
of July, 1868. It passed the House of Representatives soon after,
with amendments that were disagreed to by the Senate. The bill
and amendments were referred to a conference committee which reported
a modified bill which passed both Houses and was sent to President
Johnson, but at so late a period of the session that it was not
approved by him and thus failed to become a law.

The committee on finance at the next and closing session of that
Congress deemed it useless to report another funding bill, and on
the 16th of December, 1868, I reported, by direction of that
committee, the following resolution:

"_Resolved by the Senate_, That neither public policy nor the good
faith of the nation will allow the redemption of the 5-20 bonds
until the United States shall perform its primary duty of paying
its notes in coin or making them equivalent thereto; and measures
shall be adopted by Congress to secure the resumption of specie
payments at as early a period as practicable."

This resolution was the foundation of the act "to strengthen the
public credit," the first act subsequently adopted in General
Grant's administration. Neither this nor any other financial
measure was pressed to a conclusion, as we knew that any measure
that would be sanctioned by Congress would probably be vetoed by
the President. This, however, did not stop the almost continuous
financial debate which extended to the currency, banking, funding
and taxation. The drift of opinion was in favor of resumption
without contraction, and funding at low rates of interest on a coin
basis. The wide breach between Congress and the President