f welfare of the State, that of selfish interest, may be made to
change before our eyes into the meanest of maxims. This process is,
however, not unique in the history of the relations of thought and
life.

A detailed study of the relations of intellectual factors to war would
need to consider the effects of a great number of more or less
philosophical ideas which throw their weight on the side of war. So
far as these ideas are simple and clear, and especially if they can be
conveyed in the form of the phrase, their influence cannot wholly be
ignored. Some we have already referred to. The doctrine that might
makes right, the conception of state as supreme, the belief in the
divine right of kings, the belief in the ordained rights of
aristocracy, belief in militarism as a social institution, the
doctrine that life may be controlled by reason, all intellectual
pessimism, skepticism, any form of concept-worship, whether Hegelian
or other, acceptance of the methods of science and the results of
science as applicable to all the problems of life--all such principles
which inhabit the region, so to speak, between philosophy and the
practical life manifestly have some relation to the spirit of war. In
a very general way they may be counted as philosophical factors in
war. For the most part, however, those ideas that have been accused
of abetting war are exaggerations and perversions of philosophical
ideas. Nietzsche, Darwin and Hegel have all been exploited and made to
stand sponsor for specific philosophies of war. In the new philosophy
of life which Patten thinks has greatly influenced German conduct, and
which may be expressed in the words _Dienst_, _Ordnung_, and _Kraft_,
we can see both the effects of impulses that have grown out of the new
life itself, and the influences of formal philosophy. That such ideas
have had relatively a greater influence in Germany than elsewhere must
be admitted, but that either this devotion to ideas or the ideas
themselves have been derived from philosophical interests and from
philosophies that have played any important part in the history of
thought we may well doubt. We should suspect that the same practical
interest that works unceasingly to distort and popularize philosophy
would help to create such pseudo-philosophy.

Von Buelow (65) says that the German people have a passion for logic,
and that this passion amounts to fanaticism:--that when an
intellectual form or system has been fou