which a confession is used which is
"procured * * * by fraud, collusion, trickery and subornation or
perjury."

In conformity with these rulings, the Court, in Ward _v._ Texas,[886]
set aside a conviction based upon a confession obtained, by methods of
coercion and duress, from a defendant who had been arrested illegally,
without warrant, by the sheriff of another county, and removed to a
county more than a hundred miles away, and who for three days, while
being driven from county to county, was questioned continuously by
various officers and falsely informed by them of threats of mob
violence. Similarly, in Ashcraft _v._ Tennessee,[887] the use in a State
court of a confession obtained near the end of a 36-hour period of
practically continuous questioning, under powerful electric lights, by
relays of officers, experienced investigators, and highly trained
lawyers was held to be violative of constitutional right by reason of
the inherently coercive character of such interrogation. Justice
Jackson, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Roberts, dissented on the
ground that the accused not only denied that the protracted questioning
"had the effect of forcing an involuntary confession from him" but that
he had ever confessed at all, a contention which reputable witnesses
contradicted. Referring to Justice Holmes's warning against "the ever
increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down * * *
the constitutional rights of the States."[888] Justice Jackson protested
that "interrogation _per se_ is not, * * *, an outlaw"; and that
inasmuch as all questioning is "'inherently coercive' * * *, the
ultimate question * * * [must be] whether the confessor was in
possession of his own will and self-control at the time of [his]
confession."[889]

This dissent was not without effect. In June 1944, in Lyons _v._
Oklahoma,[890] the Court finally handed down a ruling calculated
definitely to arrest the suspicion that had been developing that the use
of any confession made after arrest would render a trial
constitutionally defective. Here, six Justices refused to overturn a
holding of the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals which labelled as
voluntary and usable a second confession obtained by other than coercive
means within twelve hours after the defendant had made a confession
admittedly under duress. The vice of coerced confessions, these Justices
asserted, was that they offended "basic standards of justice, not
be