son why he should be
here at all, or why, being here, he should remain here any
longer,--unable to prove that it would not be better for the world at
large, if all necks, his own included, were wrung five minutes
hence--is there not something fundamentally irrational in our
determination to continue in existence as long as we possibly can--that
universal will-to-live, which forms the basis of all particular
volitions, and supplies the motive power to our plans, purposes,
preparations and policies for our own or others' good? Challenged to
show cause why we should linger here a moment longer, what answer could
any of us give that would have the slightest claim to "the universal
validity of reason"? Reason cannot be bullied into acquiescence by the
importance of individuals in their own eyes. Was there ever a great
man whose sudden extinction would not have been hailed with joy by a
considerable section of his contemporaries, or a little one who would
not have made things pleasanter for somebody by taking himself off?

If we limit the word "rational" to the processes of thought which issue
in demonstrations after the manner of mathematical arguments, and if
all behaviour is to be termed irrational which involves the taking of a
risk, I see no escape from the conclusion that human life is infected
with irrationality at its very core. So far as any of us act upon the
assumption that it is better for us to exist than not to exist we are
assuming what can never be "proved."

But, for my own part, I am not prepared to put these limitations on the
word "rational." The traditional logic of the schools, on which this
notion of rationality is founded, turns out on examination to cover no
more than a departmental activity of the human mind. The type of
conclusion to which it leads us is determined in advance by the rules
it lays down for its own procedure, in the one department where such
procedure is possible. Free activity, which is the essence of
self-consciousness, and the life of all creative work, lies entirely
outside its province, and the attempt to deal with it by departmental
rules yields nothing but the rank absurdity that freedom itself is
absurd.[2] The logic in question may be compared to a locomotive
engine which can move only on the rails that have been laid down for
it; and the philosopher who would apprehend the things of the spirit by
the means which it affords him is like a man who rides an engine rathe