he retreat
is effected from Poissy northward to the victorious field of Crecy, and
later from Crecy, on the same line, to the siege and capture of Calais.
The time occupied from the day of landing to the day of the Battle of
Crecy inclusive, is but forty-six days, of which not quite two-thirds are
taken up by advance, and rather more than a third by the retreat. The
English troops landed on Wednesday, July 12th, 1346. They crossed the
Seine at Poissy upon August 14th. They fought at Crecy upon Saturday,
August 26th.
The total distance traversed by the main body in these two limbs of the
campaign is instructive as showing the leisure of the first part, its
advance, and the precipitancy of the second part, its retreat.
The distance by road as the army marched from St Vaast, where it landed,
across the river at Poissy, and so to Crecy, was a total of 345 miles. Of
this the first part, or advance, was 215, the second part, or retreat,
130. The first part occupied, counting the day of landing and the day of
crossing at Poissy, not less than 34 days, while the latter portion or
retreat of 130 miles, including the day of battle itself, took up not more
than 12 days, or, excluding the battle, only 11. The average rate of the
advance was not more than 6-1/4 miles a day, the average rate of the
retreat very nearly double.
It must not be imagined, of course, that the advance took place in prompt
and regular fashion. It was, as we shall see, irresolute for many days,
and irregular throughout, while the retreat was a hurried one upon all but
one day of which the troops were pressed to their uttermost. But the
contrast is sufficient to show the difference between the frames of mind
in which Edward III. took up the somewhat hazy plan of an "invasion,"
which was really no more than a raid, and that in which he attempted to
extricate himself from the consequences of his original vagueness of
intent. In the first, he was as slow as he was uncertain; in the second,
he was as precipitate as he was determined.
* * * * *
In the last days of June, 1346, Edward III. had gathered a force, small
indeed for the purpose which he seems to have had in mind, but large under
the conditions of transport which he could command. It was probably just
under 20,000 actual fighting men. At this point, however, as it is of
material interest to the rest of the story, we must pause to consider what
these units meant. W
|