e to get. But
the right way to estimate the disproportion between the offensive and the
defensive upon this famous day is to contrast the fully armoured mounted
men of either side, and, further, to contrast
1. The trained infantry, armed with missile weapons.
2. The infantry, trained or untrained, armed only with spear, dagger, or
sword.
Upon such an analysis we get some such result as follows:--
Some 4000 fully armoured mounted men in Edward's command, of whom only
3000 or less were out of the reserve and in the line. Some 7000 Archers
actually in the defensive line, with a much smaller number (unknown) in
the reserve. Add 4000 Spearmen, for the most part Welsh. Against these on
the offensive you may set, at the very least, quite four times their
number of fully mounted armoured men and probably six times their number,
or even more. As against the English Archers, we must count for the
missile arm upon the French side somewhat less. The only contemporary
authority, Villani, who gives us any exact figures, names 6000 as their
number.
When we come to the few trained non-missile infantry of the English
forces--some 4000 in the line, not counting the reserve,--and contrast
them with the rabble of untrained and scattered French countrymen, most
of whom were still coming up in the rear and did not take part in the
action (save to suffer slaughter in the darkness after it was over), we
can take any multiple we choose. They may have been five, six or eight
times as numerous as the Welshmen with whom they did not come into contact
at all.
It will be seen from the above that the real point of the battle, and that
which decided it, was the power of the trained missile infantry of Edward
(1) to await a charge of horse in no matter what numerical superiority it
might arrive, confident that they could always check it before it reached
their line or broke it; and inspired by that confidence, because (2) the
only missile infantry that could be brought against them to prepare such a
cavalry charge was armed with a weapon which delivered only one shot to
their three. That was the deciding element of the Battle of Crecy: the
power of the long-bow to stop horse upon any front equivalent to the front
of the Archers, and the confidence of the bowman in that power.
* * * * *
The action opened regularly enough with the advance of the French missile
infantry, the Genoese mercenaries, at the hour,
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