rawn into the war, but he
perceived also what most of his critics failed to perceive, that the
immediate danger of the country was not war but a divided people. While
he was engaging in framing the first Lusitania note he discussed the
situation with one of his callers at the White House in words that have
since proved prophetic:

I do not know whether the German Government intends to keep faith
with the United States or not. It is my personal opinion that
Germany has no such intention, but I am less concerned about the
ultimate intentions of Germany than about the attitude of the
American people, who are already divided into three groups: those
who are strongly pro-German, those who are strongly pro-Ally, and
the vast majority who expect me to find a way to keep the United
States out of war. I do not want war, yet I do not know that I can
keep the country out of the war. That depends on Germany, and I
have no control over Germany. _But I intend to handle this
situation in such a manner that every American citizen will know
that the United States Government has done everything it could to
prevent war. Then if war comes we shall have a united country, and
with a united country there need be no fear about the result._

Mr. Wilson's policy from that day to April 2, 1917, must be read in the
light of those words. He plunged forthwith into that extraordinary
debate with the German Government over the submarine issue--the most
momentous debate ever held--but he was only incidentally addressing
himself to the rulers of Germany. He was talking to the conscience of
the civilized world, but primarily to the conscience of the United
States, explaining, clarifying, elucidating the issue. His reluctance
to countenance any extensive measures of preparedness was the product
of a definite resolution not to give Germany and her American
supporters an opportunity to declare that the United States, while
these issues were pending, was arming for war against the Imperial
Government.

When Mr. Wilson began this debate he knew something which his critics
did not know and which for reasons of state he did not choose to tell
them. Weeks before the destruction of the Lusitania two-thirds of the
German General Staff were in favor of war with the United States as a
military measure in the interest of Germany. They were under the spell
of Tirpitz. They believed that the submarine could do