is not enough; we
must manifest our forgiveness, and this for three good reasons: first,
in order to secure us against self-illusion and to test the sincerity
of our dispositions; secondly, in order to put an end to discord by
showing the other party that we hold no grudge; lastly, in order to
remove whatever scandal may have been given by our breach of
friendship. The disorder of enmity can be thoroughly cured and healed
only by an open renewal of the ties of friendship; and this is done by
the offering and acknowledgment of the signs of friendship.

The signs of friendship are of two sorts, the one common, the other
special. Common tokens of friendship are those signs which are current
among people of the same condition of life; such as saluting, answering
a question, dealing in business affairs, etc. These are commonly
regarded as sufficient to take away any reasonable suspicion of hatred,
although, in matter of fact, the inference may be false. But the
refusal to give such tokens of pardon usually argues the presence of an
uncharitable feeling that is sinful; it is nearly always evidence of an
unforgiving spirit. There are certain cases wherein the offense
received being of a peculiar nature, justifies one in deferring such
evidence of forgiveness; but these cases are rare.

If we are obliged to show by unmistakable signs that we forgive a wrong
that has been done, we are in nowise bound to make a particular friend
of the person who has been guilty of the wrong. We need not go out of
our way to meet him, receive or visit him or treat him as a long lost
brother. He would not expect it, and we fulfil our obligations toward
him by the ordinary civilities we show him in the business of life.

If we have offended, we must take the first step toward reconciliation
and apologize; that is the only way we have of repairing the injury
done, and to this we are held in conscience. If there is equal blame on
both sides, then both are bound to the same duty of offering an
apology. To refuse such advances on the part of one who has wronged us
is to commit an offense that might very easily be grievous.

All this, of course, is apart from the question of indemnification in
case of real damage being sustained. We may condone an offense and at
the same time require that the loss suffered be repaired. And in case
the delinquent refuse to settle amicably, we are justified in pursuing
him before the courts. Justice is not necessarily