he ground of a mere
probability. This, however, does not prevent us from taking a cue from
our suspicion and acting guardedly towards him. This does not mean that
we adjudge him dishonest, but that we deem him capable of being
dishonest, which is true and in accordance with the laws of prudence.

Neither are we bound to overlook all evidence that points to a man's
guilt through fear of judging him unfavorably. It is not wrong to judge
a man according to his merits, to have a right opinion of him, even
when that opinion is not to his credit. All that is necessary is that
we have good reason on Which to base that opinion. If a neighbor does
evil in our presence or to our knowledge he forfeits, and justly, our
good opinion; he is to blame, and not we. We are not obliged to close
our eyes to the truth of facts, and it is on facts that our judgments
are formed.

CHAPTER XCII.
MENDACITY.

TO lie is to utter an untruth, with full knowledge that it is an
untruth. The untruth may be expressed by any conventional sign, by
word, deed, gesture, or even by silence. Its malice and disorder
consists in the opposition that exists between our idea and the
expression we give to it; our words convey a meaning contrary to what
is in our mind; we say one thing and mean another. If we unwittingly
utter what is contrary to fact, that is error; if we so clumsily
translate our thoughts as to give a false impression of what we mean,
and we do the best we can, that is a blunder; if in a moment of
listlessness and inattention we speak in a manner that conflicts with
our state of mind, that is temporary mental aberration. But if we
knowingly give out as truth what we know is not the truth, we lie
purely and simply.

In misrepresentations of this kind it is not required that there be a
plainly formulated purpose of deceiving another; an implicit intention,
a disposition to allow our words to run their natural course, is
sufficient to give such utterances a character of mendacity. For,
independently of our mental attitude, it is in the nature of a lie to
deceive; an intention, or rather a pretense to the contrary, does not
affect that nature. The fact of lying presupposes that we intend in
some manner to practise deception; if we did not have such a purpose we
would not resort to lying. If you stick a knife into a man, you may
pretend what you like, but you did certainly intend to hurt him and
make him feel badly.

Nor has any ulterior mo