ish if they take Ypres will have been a
flattening out of the British salient.

Germany cannot be content with occasional bending of the Allies' line.
The process is too slow and too costly. Germany has almost, if not
quite, reached her maximum strength, and the losses she now suffers will
be difficult to replace. Viewing the situation entirely from the German
standpoint, success can only mean breaking through and attacking the two
exposed flanks at the point pierced. This would force a retreat as in
the case of the Russian lines along the Dunajec, which will be taken up
later on. No other form of action can be decisive, though it might
permit a little more of Belgian or French territory to change hands.
This would, of course, in case the war were declared a draw, give
Germany an additional advantage in the discussion of terms of peace,
especially if the rule of uti posseditis were applied as a basis from
which to begin negotiations. But this contingency is too remote for
present consideration.

As to the probability of German success around Ypres, it seems to grow
less as time passes. After the first rush was over and the British lines
had time to re-form Germany has accomplished nothing. Moreover, it is
certain that in back of the short twenty-five miles of line held by the
British troops there is a reserve of almost a half million men. No other
portion of the battle line in either theatre has such great latent
strength ready to be thrown in when the critical moment comes. Just why
it has not been used so far is a mystery, the solution of which can be
found only in the brain of Sir John French. But it is known to be in
France and is there for a purpose.

From Loos to Arras the French have undertaken the most ambitious and the
most successful offensive movement made in the west since Winter set in.
The entire French line along this front of twenty-five miles, taking the
Germans by surprise, has gone forward a distance varying from one-half
to two and a half miles. The attack was launched at an extremely
opportune moment. The Germans were, in the first place, extremely busy
in the north at Ypres, and were making every effort to drive that attack
home. The probabilities were, therefore, that the line in front of the
Arras-Loos position was none too strong, and that such reserves as could
be spared had been sent north. Then, again, it would tend to divert
attention from the Ypres line, and so relieve somewhat the pressu