efence
was roughly the line of the spruit, but for some reason, probably to
establish a cross fire, one advanced position was occupied upon either
flank. On the left flank was a farmhouse, which was held by two hundred
men of the Artillery Rifles. On the extreme right was another outpost of
twenty-four Canadians and forty-five Mounted Infantry. They occupied no
defensible position, and their situation was evidently a most dangerous
one, only to be justified by some strong military reason which is not
explained by any account of the action.

The Boer guns had opened fire, and considerable bodies of the enemy
appeared upon the flanks and in front. Their first efforts were devoted
towards getting possession of the farmhouse, which would give them
a point d'appui from which they could turn the whole line. Some five
hundred of them charged on horseback, but were met by a very steady fire
from the Artillery Rifles, while the guns raked them with shrapnel. They
reached a point within five hundred yards of the building, but the fire
was too hot, and they wheeled round in rapid retreat. Dismounting in
a mealie-patch they skirmished up towards the farmhouse once more, but
they were again checked by the fire of the defenders and by a pompom
which Colonel Keir had brought up. No progress whatever was made by the
attack in this quarter.

In the meantime the fate which might have been foretold had befallen
the isolated detachment of Canadians and 28th Mounted Infantry upon
the extreme right. Bruce Carruthers, the Canadian officer in command,
behaved with the utmost gallantry, and was splendidly seconded by his
men. Overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, amid a perfect hail of
bullets they fought like heroes to the end. 'There have been few finer
instances of heroism in the course of the campaign,' says the reticent
Kitchener in his official despatch. Of the Canadians eighteen were hit
out of twenty-one, and the Mounted Infantry hard by lost thirty out of
forty-five before they surrendered.

This advantage gained upon the right flank was of no assistance to the
Boers in breaking the British line. The fact that it was so makes it
the more difficult to understand why this outpost was so exposed. The
burghers had practically surrounded Cookson's force, and De la Rey and
Kemp urged on the attack; but their artillery fire was dominated by
the British guns, and no weak point could be found in the defence. At 1
o'clock the attack had bee