possible arming of the slaves;
and the newspapers were prophesying that the Administration would
presently force the issue. It is to be observed that Lee did not advise
Virginia to wait for Confederate action. He advocated emancipation
by the State. After all, to both Lee and Smith, Virginia was their
"country."

During the next sixty days Lee rejected two great opportunities--or,
if you will, put aside two great temptations. If tradition is to be
trusted, it was during January that Lee refused to play the role of
Cromwell by declining to intervene directly in general Confederate
politics. But there remained open the possibility of his intervention in
Virginia politics, and the local crisis was in its own way as momentous
as the general crisis. What if Virginia had accepted the views of Lee
and insisted upon the immediate arming of the slaves? Virginia, however,
did not do so; and Lee, having made public his position, refrained from
further participation. Politically speaking, he maintained a splendid
isolation at the head of the armies.

Through January and February the Virginia crisis continued undetermined.
In this period of fateful hesitation, the "mountains of prejudice"
proved too great to be undermined even by the influence of Lee. When
at last Virginia enacted a law permitting the arming of her slaves, no
provision was made for their manumission.

Long before the passage of this act in Virginia, Congress had become
the center of the controversy. Davis had come to the point where no
tradition however cherished would stand, in his mind, against the needs
of the moment. To reinforce the army in great strength was now his
supreme concern, and he saw but one way to do it. As a last resort
he was prepared to embrace the bold plan which so many people still
regarded with horror and which as late as the previous November he
himself had opposed. He would arm the slaves. On February 10, 1865,
bills providing for the arming of the slaves were introduced both in the
House and in the Senate.

On this issue all the forces both of the Government and the opposition
fought their concluding duel in which were involved all the other basal
issues that had distracted the country since 1862. Naturally there was
a bewildering criss-cross of political motives. There were men who,
like Smith and Lee, would go along with the Government on emancipation,
provided it was to be carried out by the free will of the States. There
were othe