s, as we are all aware, in knotty questions and quagmires.
Now what I have to repeat in this connection is, that you should, in
your debates, overhaul portions or chapters of systematic logic, with a
view to present the difficulties in their natural position in the
subject. You might, for example, take up the question as to the Province
of logic, with its divisions, parts, and order--all which admit of many
various views--and bring forward the vexed controversies under lights
favourable to their resolution. Regarding logic as an aid to the
faculties in tackling whatever is abstruse, you should endeavour to
cultivate and enhance its powers, in this particular, by detailed
exposition and criticism of all its canons and prescriptions. The
department of Classification is a good instance; a region full of
delicate subtleties as well as "bread-and-butter" applications.
It is in this last view of logic that we can canvass philosophical
systems upon the ground of their method or procedure alone. Looking at
the absence, in any given system, of the arts and precautions that are
indispensable to the establishment of truth in the special case, we may
pronounce against it, _a priori_; we know that such a system can be true
only by accident, or else by miracle. We may reasonably demand of a
system-builder--Is he in the narrow way that leadeth to truth, or in the
broad way that leadeth somewhere else?
I have said that I consider the connection between Logic and Psychology
to be but slender, although not unimportant. The amount and nature of
this connection would reward a careful consideration. There would be
considerable difficulty in seeing any connection at all between the
Aristotelian Syllogism and psychology, but for the high-sounding
designations appended to the notion and the proposition--simple
apprehension and judgment--of which I fail to discover the propriety or
relevance. I know that Grote gave a very profound turn to the employment
of the term "judgment" by Aristotle, as being a recognition of the
relativity of knowledge to the affirming mind. I am not to say,
absolutely, "Ice is cold"; I am to say that, to the best of my judgment
or belief, or in so far as I am concerned, ice is cold. This, however,
has little to do with the logic of the syllogism, and not much with any
logic. So, when we speak of a "notion," we must understand it as
apprehended by some mind; but for nearly all purposes, this is assumed
tacitly; it n
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