retire. A repulse was a sure defeat; and a defeat was most
commonly total destruction. When we recollect the complete armor of
the Roman soldiers, their discipline, exercises, evolutions, fortified
camps, and military engines, it appears a just matter of surprise,
how the naked and unassisted valor of the barbarians could dare to
encounter, in the field, the strength of the legions, and the various
troops of the auxiliaries, which seconded their operations. The contest
was too unequal, till the introduction of luxury had enervated the
vigor, and a spirit of disobedience and sedition had relaxed the
discipline, of the Roman armies. The introduction of barbarian
auxiliaries into those armies, was a measure attended with very obvious
dangers, as it might gradually instruct the Germans in the arts of war
and of policy. Although they were admitted in small numbers and with the
strictest precaution, the example of Civilis was proper to convince the
Romans, that the danger was not imaginary, and that their precautions
were not always sufficient. [74] During the civil wars that followed
the death of Nero, that artful and intrepid Batavian, whom his enemies
condescended to compare with Hannibal and Sertorius, [75] formed a great
design of freedom and ambition. Eight Batavian cohorts renowned in the
wars of Britain and Italy, repaired to his standard. He introduced an
army of Germans into Gaul, prevailed on the powerful cities of Treves
and Langres to embrace his cause, defeated the legions, destroyed their
fortified camps, and employed against the Romans the military knowledge
which he had acquired in their service. When at length, after an
obstinate struggle, he yielded to the power of the empire, Civilis
secured himself and his country by an honorable treaty. The Batavians
still continued to occupy the islands of the Rhine, [76] the allies, not
the servants, of the Roman monarchy.

[Footnote 72: Missilia spargunt,
Tacit. Germ. c. 6. Either that historian used a vague expression, or
he meant that they were thrown at random.]

[Footnote 73: It was their
principal distinction from the Sarmatians, who generally fought on
horseback.]

[Footnote 74: The relation of this enterprise occupies a great part
of the fourth and fifth books of the History of Tacitus, and is more
remarkable for its eloquence than perspicuity. Sir Henry Saville has
observed several inaccuracies.]

[Footnote 75: Tacit. Hist. iv. 13. Like them he had lost a