not,
gentlemen, shrink from any part of the passage, for I feel that it cannot
bear with any heavy pressure against me. "To talk of the British
Constitution is, in my opinion, a sure proof of dishonesty." Here it
will be seen that the only exception that can be taken to this sentence
is the mere mode of expression. If a man were to talk to me of the
Constitution of England, and, by omitting all notice of its aberrations
in practice from its theory, by which he would leave it free to me to
suspect, that he would insinuate that the theory and the practice were
the same, I should certainly say, that he was exhibiting want of candour.
I might, perhaps, think dishonesty, rather too strong a term for such
conduct; but I should not scruple to say, that he was disingenuous, and
he _would_ be guilty of a species of dishonesty; for all the
disingenuousness is to a degree dishonest; and, since the meaning is the
same, why should we quarrel at a mere difference of expression? The
author proceeds to say, "If we speak of the Spanish Constitution, we have
something tangible; there is a substance and meaning as well as sound."
So that it is clear he was saying, that we had no Constitution in
comparison with that just promulged by the Spanish nation. The Spaniards
we know have recently gained by their own glorious efforts, that
political liberty to which they had been so long strangers; and their
Legislature had just published a code of fundamental laws, few in number,
but most comprehensive in securing freedom to the people, for whom they
are framed. They are (comparatively with the laws of countries, in which
the frame of government is old, and complicated) not numerous, but the
mind may collect them almost at a glance, and possess itself of them with
a single effort of the understanding. In this view of the subject,
without doubt, the Constitution of Spain is tangible; and in this sense
he is justified in asserting that our own Constitution is not tangible;
for is it not notorious that our laws are spread through so many Acts of
Parliament of doubtful and difficult construction, and so many books of
reports, containing the common law of the land (and in which there are no
few conflicting decisions) that the whole life of a man does not suffice
to achieve a knowledge of them. So multifarious and infinite and
perplexed is our code, that even amongst those whose profession is the
law it is not possible to meet with an accomplished