onds of union between the French
people, and impart greater intensity to their patriotism, Napoleon
authorized the re-establishment of popular clubs, and the formation of
civic confederations. This time his expectations were not answered by
success. The major part of the clubs were filled with men, who
formerly composed the revolutionary tribunals and societies; and their
imprecations against kings, and their liberticide motions, made the
Emperor fear, that he had revived the spirit of anarchy.

The sentiments manifested by the federates equally disquieted him. He
perceived, that he did not occupy the first place in their thoughts
and affections; that the primary wish of their hearts was liberty;
and, as this liberty was in his eyes synonimous with republicanism, he
exerted all his endeavours to moderate, restrain, and repress, the
development of these patriotic associations. Perhaps there were men
among the federates, whose principles might be dangerous, and their
intentions criminal: but in general they consisted of pure patriots,
who had taken up arms to defend the imperial government, and not to
overturn it.

Napoleon had never been able to surmount the aversion, which he felt
for the veterans of the revolution. He dreaded their constancy, and
their daring spirit; and he would have thought himself in danger, if
not lost, had they become consolidated, and resumed their ascendancy.
This panic fear was the cause, that he did not reap from the
confederations the advantages he promised himself; and which they
would unquestionably have afforded him, if he had not clogged their
wings. It was also the cause of his committing a perhaps still greater
fault, that of putting a stop to the popular movements, that had shown
themselves in most of the departments. In the critical state in which
he found himself, and into which he had drawn France, he should not
have disregarded any means of security; and the most efficacious, the
most analogous to his situation, was indisputably that of engaging the
people most intimately in his fate, and in his defence. It was
necessary, therefore, while preventing them from spilling a single
drop of blood, to let them compromise themselves with some of those
incorrigible ultras, who had harassed, ill-treated, and insulted
them, since the restoration. The people would then have been more
sensible, that it was no longer the personal cause of Napoleon alone,
that they had to defend; and the dread