ope is, I
imagine, in reality much greater than Richet's estimate, chiefly because
he takes little account of the indirect costs, which may well be the
greatest of all. The cost to the fiscal departments of Government is
probably only a small part of the total cost which the people will have
to bear. The killing and disabling of the men engaged will cut off the
financial support of European families to the tune of hundreds of
millions of dollars per year. The physical destruction of capital
through the devastation of crops, the burning and demolishing of
merchant ships and buildings, the crippling of industry through the
sudden withdrawal of labor and raw materials, the introduction of new
trade risks, and the cutting off of transportation, both internal and
foreign, make up a sum of items which cannot be measured, but which may
exceed those which can. Last, but not least, is the impairment of that
subtle but vital basis of business, commercial credit.

In short, the central effect is a vast impairment of Europe's current
income and of the capital from which her future income will flow. It
means a veritable impoverishment of vast populations. The great burden
will bear heaviest, of course, on the poor. It will impinge very
unequally and will cause a great redistribution of wealth. As always
happens, some people, mostly lucky speculators, will come out of the
melee wealthier than before. This fact will not serve to lessen the
discontent of the masses, which their impoverishment is sure to create.
Food prices will be high, the earnings of labor will be low, and after
the war unemployment will be great, due to the impossibility of quick
absorption into the industrial system of returned soldiers, as well as
other maladjustments which the war is sure to bring.

The victor may secure indemnity for part of the loss, but not for all;
he will, in spite of himself, be a net loser. Taxes will be a crushing
burden, merely to secure funds with which to pay high interest on vast
new war debts, to say nothing of funds with which to purchase new
armaments--if again the nations are forced, by lack of international
control, to resume the stupendous folly of racing each other in military
equipments.

Bankruptcy and Revolution.

It may well be that among the economic consequences of the war there
will be some national bankruptcies, and that among the political
consequences will be revolutions. High prices, high taxes, low wages,
and