ll
have succeeded in completely suppressing the rebellion--what then will
be the proper principle of action? Will not the Constitution of itself,
by the simple force of its own terms, revert to its ordinary operation,
and spread its benign protection over every part of the country? Will
not all the States, returning to their allegiance, be entitled to hold
their place in the Union, upon the same footing which they held prior to
the fatal attempt at secession? These are indeed momentous questions,
demanding a speedy solution.

If we say that the Federal Government may put the States upon any
different footing than that established by the existing Constitution,
then we virtually abrogate that instrument which accurately prescribes
the means by which alone its provisions can be altered or amended. But,
on the other hand, if we concede the right of each State, after making
war on the Union until it is finally conquered, quietly to return and
take its place again with all the rights and privileges it held before,
just as if nothing had happened in the _interim_, then, indeed, do we
make of the Federal Government a veritable temple of discord. We subject
it to the danger of perpetual convulsions, without the power to protect
itself except by the repetition of sanguinary wars, whenever the caprice
or ambition of any State might lead her into the experiment of
rebellion. Between these two unreasonable and contradictory
alternatives--the right of the Government to change its forms, and the
right of the rebellious State to assume its place in the union without
conditions--there must be some middle ground upon which both parties may
stand securely without doing violence to any constitutional principle.
The Federal Government is clothed with power, and has imposed upon it
the duty, to conquer the rebellion. This is an axiom in the political
philosophy of every true Union man, and we therefore do not stop to
argue a point disputed only by the enemies of our cause. But if the
Government has power to conquer the domestic enemy in arms against it,
then, as a necessary consequence, it must be the sole judge as to when
the conquest has been accomplished; in other words, it must pronounce
when and in what manner the state of internal war shall cease to exist.
This implies nothing more than the right claimed by every belligerent
power, and always exercised by the conqueror--that of deciding for
itself how far the war shall be carried--what