, and a sufficient
knowledge of arts and sciences presupposed; I there were two things in
human literature, a comprehension of which would be of very great use,
to enable a man to be a rational and able casuist, which otherwise was
very difficult, if not impossible: I. A convenient knowledge of moral
philosophy; especially that part of it which treats of the nature of
human actions: To know, _'quid sit actus humanus (spontaneus, invitus,
mixtus), unde habet bonitatem et malitiam moralem? an ex genere et
objecto, vel ex circumstantiis?'_ How the variety of circumstances
varies the goodness or evil of human actions? How far knowledge and
ignorance may aggravate or excuse, increase or diminish the goodness
or evil of our actions? For every case of conscience being only
this--'Is this action good or bad? May I do it, or may I not?'--He
who, in these, knows not how and whence human actions become morally
good and evil, never can (_in hypothesi_) rationally and certainly
determine, whether this or that particular action be so.--2. The
second thing, which," he said, "would be a great help and advantage to
a casuist, was a convenient knowledge of the nature and obligation of
laws in general: to know what a law is; what a natural and a positive
law; what's required to the _'latio, dispensato, derogatio, vel
abrogalio legis;'_ what promulgation is antecedently required to
the obligation of any positive law; what ignorance takes off the
obligation of a law, or does excuse, diminish, or aggravate the
transgression: For every case of conscience being only this--'Is this
lawful for me, or is it not?' and the law the only rule and measure by
which I must judge of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of any action;
it evidently follows, that he who, in these, knows not the nature and
obligation of laws, never can be a good casuist, or rationally assure
himself or others, of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of actions in
particular."

[Sidenote: Conclusion]

This was the judgment and good counsel of that learned and pious
Prelate: And having, by long experience, found the truth and benefit
of it, I conceive, I could not without ingratitude to him, and want
of charity to others, conceal it.--Pray pardon this rude, and, I fear
impertinent scribble, which, if nothing else, may signify thus much,
that I am willing to obey your desires, and am indeed,

Your affectionate friend,

THOMAS LINCOLN.

London, May 10, 1678.

[Footnote 1: Robert