nwright Board was convened to
investigate the parts taken in the Santiago naval battle respectively
by Admiral Sampson and Admiral Schley. But in official phrase this
board was convened for the purpose of determining the position and
courses of the ships engaged in the action at Santiago July 3, and
reporting to the Secretary of the Navy.

The report is:

"U.S.F.S. New York, First Rate, Navy Yard, New York, Oct. 8,
1898.--Sir: In obedience to your order of Sept. 2, 1898, appointing
us a board to plot the positions of the ships of Admiral Cervera's
squadron and those of the United States fleet in the battle of July 3,
off Santiago de Cuba, we have the honor to submit the following report,
accompanied by a chart, showing the positions of the ships at seven
different times.

"These times, as taken by the United States ships engaged, with the
incidents noted, are as follows:

"No. 1, 9:35 a.m.--Maria Teresa came out of the harbor.

"No. 2, 9:50 a.m.--Pluton came out.

"No. 3, 10:15 a.m.--Maria Teresa turned to run ashore.

"No. 4, 10:20 a.m.--Oquendo turned to run ashore.

"No. 5, 10:30 a.m.--Furor blew up and Pluton turned to run ashore.

"No. 6, 11:05 a.m.--Vizcaya turned to run ashore.

"No. 7, 1:15 p.m.--Colon surrendered.

"The chart selected by the board for plotting is H.O. chart No. 716,
1885, West Indies, eastern part of Bahama Islands, with part of
Cuba and north coast of San Domingo. This selection was made after
a careful comparison with all other charts at hand, as the positions
of the principal headlands and inlets and the distances between them
on it agree more nearly with the observation of members of the board
than those given by any other.

"The positions of the United States ships were established by known
bearings and distances from the Morro at No. 1, with the exception
of the New York, whose position is plotted by the revolutions of its
engines during a run of forty-five minutes cast from its position,
southeast half south of the Morro, 6,000 yards. Position at No. 2 is
plotted by all ships according to their relative bearings from each
other, the operations of their engines from 9:35 to 9:50, the evidence
of the officers on board them, and the ranges used in firing at the
Spanish ships. Position No. 3 is plotted from observations of the
officers of the United States ships, with regard to their nearness
to each other, and relative bearings of themselves from Teresa,
with ranges in use a