d will again without fail,
in the contract signed by Sr. Emilio; and convince yourself, my friend,
that it is necessary to do this; and when it is done the whole world
will wonder and say that we have done well, and will not be able to
give out that the people here are fools spending the time sucking
their fingers." [130]
Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposed
American attack on the 13th instant, as is shown by the following
letter:--
"(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary. Office of the
Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.)
"_Senor Don Artemio Ricarte_: [131]
"My Dear Sir: I have received to-day your kind letter giving warning
of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your personal interest
in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. I assure you that I am yours,
most truly and sincerely,
"_Luis Martinez Alcobendas_.
"_Singalon_, August 10, 1898." [132]
According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of this
sort. He says:--
"The officers of the United States Army who believed that the
insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American movements were
right. Sastron has printed a letter from Pio del Pilar, dated July
30, to the Spanish officer commanding at Santa Ana, in which Pilar
said that Aguinaldo had told him that the Americans would attack
the Spanish lines on August 2 and advised that the Spaniards should
not give way, but hold their positions. Pilar added, however, that
if the Spaniards should fall back on the walled city and surrender
Santa Ana to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo's
information was correct, and on August 2 eight American soldiers were
killed or wounded by the Spanish fire." [133]
Taylor continues:--
"And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. It is not
probable that these were the only two such letters written. Aguinaldo
had by this time found out that although he could defeat the scattered
Spanish detachments, he could not defeat the Spanish force holding the
lines of Manila. He did not want the Americans in the Philippines. They
were in his way, and he had already made up his mind that if they
did not give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. He
saw very early that it was extremely improbable that he should obtain
from them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both among Spaniards
and Americans would, from Aguinaldo's point of view, inure to his
benefit. The best possible thin
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