vigilance ought, therefore, to be very anxiously
employed in regulating this new part of our government, and adapting it,
in such a manner, to the national constitution, that no detriment may
arise from it, and that our civil rights may be protected, not
oppressed, by the military power.

To this purpose, says the noble lord, the soldiers are to be restrained
by a due subordination to the magistrate, a position undoubtedly true,
but now superfluously urged: for it was never controverted by the noble
person whose opinion he intended to oppose.

Should any man assert, my lords, that the army ought to be formed into a
distinct and independent society, which should receive laws only from a
council of war, and have no other governour than their officers, none
should oppose such an assertion with more ardour or constancy than
myself, but what was never advanced it is unnecessary to confute.

Yet, my lords, to obviate those dangers from the army which have been so
strongly and justly represented, it is necessary, not only that a legal
subordination to the civil authority be firmly established, but that a
personal dependence on the ministry be taken away.

How readily men learn to reverence and obey those on whom their fortunes
depend, has been already shown by the noble lord, and therefore it will
follow, that a minister who distributes preferments at his pleasure, may
acquire such an influence in the army, as may be employed to secure
himself from justice by the destruction of liberty. And unless it can be
proved, that no such minister can ever exist; that corruption, ambition,
and perfidy, have place only in the military race; every argument that
shows the danger of an army, dependent only on the general, will show
the danger, likewise, of one dependent only on the minister.

The influence of the minister, my lords, is known to arise from the
number of the officers, and to be proportioned to the value of the
preferment, which it is in his power to bestow; it is, therefore,
evident, by adding new officers to our army, we shall throw weight into
the scale, which already is, at least, an equal balance to our
constitution, and enable the ministry either to employ an army in
defence of their measures, or to obtain such an influence in the senate,
as shall make any other security superfluous.

Such, my lords, is the danger of a multitude of officers, a danger which
surely deserves more attention than the imaginary prejudice o